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INTRODUCTION
Over the past years, foreign currency lending has expanded 
strongly in Hungary, and has led, amongst other things, to 
the accumulation of a sizeable net external debt by domestic 
economic agents – and in particular households – in the 
form of substantial open forint-foreign exchange positions. 
This foreign exchange position has contributed significantly 
to the financial vulnerability of the country over the past 
two years, and has also imposed constraints on economic 
policy. Although the weakening of the forint should drive 
up net exports, the depreciation of the nominal exchange 
rate increases the debt burden of companies and households, 
which are indebted in foreign currency and have no foreign 
exchange income; this in turn leads to a decline in capital 
investments and consumption, and thus may ultimately have 
a contractionary impact (Krekó and Endrész, 2010).
Analysing countries with a similar level of external debt, we 
found that the permanent and sizeable external financing 
need arising on the part of the domestic sectors (household 
and non-financial corporate sector) is not always accompanied 
by an increase in their exposure to foreign exchange rates. 
This situation occurs when the funds raised by domestic 
banks abroad are denominated not in a foreign currency, but 
rather in their own domestic currency, and thus exchange 
rate risks are assumed by foreign investors. This is only 
possible with the existence of an instrument, denominated in 
the domestic currency, which – on the basis the related risk 
and return – can be taken into consideration by a wide circle 
of investors, including non-residents in the process of 
portfolio building. Typically, such instruments include 
Hungarian local currency government securities denominated 
in forint, central bank bills and FX swaps. Foreign investors 
with lower risk appetite may deem forint bonds issued by a 
foreign non-governmental organisation, called euroforint 
bonds,1 a more attractive financial instrument.
In the following sections, we first give an overview of the role 
of the Eurobond markets in financing the economy, and of 
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This article deals with forint bonds issued by non-residents. We present the role of such bonds in financing the external debt 
in the domestic currency, as well as the typical cash flows associated with their issue and the related interest rate swaps. By 
buying so-called euroforint bonds issued by highly rated, generally supranational organisations foreign investors take the 
exchange rate risk of the external debt, while the domestic banking system obtains long-term forint financing at a fixed 
interest rate. Over the past 10–15 years, the Eurobond market has largely contributed to the ability of New Zealand and 
South Africa to finance their balance of payments deficit, while eliminating the need to burden domestic actors with the 
inherent exchange rate risk. However, in the case of the forint the market of this instrument has remained relatively immature.
In the second part of the article, we examine how and why South Africa and New Zealand have been able to successfully tap 
the Eurobond market, and what conditions should precede such an upswing in euroforint issues. We conclude that the 
euroforint bond market has remained immature primarily due to the inability of Hungarian banks, characterised by 
constrained foreign exchange liquidity, to satisfy the foreign currency financing needs of bond issuers through interest swaps, 
and consequently, they are also unable to draw on their fixed interest forint funds. This can be attributed to the fact that in 
previous years Hungarian banks financed a part of their FX loans by local currency deposits, and – seeking to hedge their 
exchange rate exposure – they buy foreign currencies and offer forint on the FX swap market. While euroforint bonds could 
be considered as an attractive target for a specific group of investors, their interest rates are not competitive compared to the 
yields attainable by speculation on the foreign exchange market.
* The views expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the offical view ot the Magyar Nemzeti Bank.
1   The name originates from the New Zealand dollar bonds enjoying great popularity with investors since the mid-1990s. These bonds are called eurokiwi bonds, referring 
to the dollar denominated bonds issued by non-residents (eurodollar bonds) on the one hand, and the popular name of the New Zealand dollar (kiwi) on the foreign 
exchange market. A Kauri bond is a New Zealand dollar-denominated bond issued in New Zealand by non-residents. These bonds are in favour with investors as they are 
accepted as security for the repo transactions of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand. However, this latter instrument falls outside the scope of this article.MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
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the market of bonds issued by non-residents for non-residents 
in that specific currency. We present the motives of issuers 
and investors, and examine how attractive targets these 
bonds can be for those pursuing a carry trade strategy2 
compared with other financial instruments. Based on previous 
years’ volume and price figures, we try to identify the reasons 
leading to the long-standing popularity of certain currencies 
and to the marginal role of others on this market.
MACROECONOMIC ROLE OF THE 
EUROBOND MARKET
The vast majority of small, open economies, including 
Hungary, struggling with a high balance of payments deficit 
and consequently with high levels of external debt, have no 
o r  o n l y  l i m i t e d  c a p a c i ty  t o  b o r r o w  a b r o a d  i n  t h e i r  o w n  
currency. Although in most cases the state is able to secure 
the inflow of funds in its own currency (that is, in forint) to 
a certain extent – 20-25 percent of Hungarian government 
securities denominated in forint are held by foreign investors 
– in these countries, the substantial majority of the external 
debt owed by the private sector is denominated in a global 
currency (dollar, euro, yen). This also means that in these 
countries, indebted economic agents run a considerable 
exchange rate risk: the depreciation of their own currency 
increases the amount of their debt calculated in their own 
currency which carries a high economic policy risk.
The phenomenon that small, open, emerging economies are 
generally unable to finance their external debt in their 
d o m e s t i c  c u r r e n c y  i s  d u b b e d  t h e  “ o r i g i n a l  s i n ”  i n  t h e  
economic literature (Eichengreen–Hausman, 1999). Even if 
foreign investors are willing to buy assets denominated in 
the domestic currency of the given country (e.g. in Hungary’s 
case, forint) generally, the government is the single domestic 
actor with an appropriate credit risk rating and ability to 
offer a sufficiently large volume of securities on the market 
viewed by foreign investors as attractive, low risk and liquid. 
The agents of the private sector, including the banking 
systems, are too risky, individual issuers have relatively low 
funding need, and are not known enough to be classified by 
the foreign investors as creditworthy in their own currency, 
therefore they can usually only draw on foreign capital in a 
foreign currency.
The existence of Eurobond markets allows a group of 
investors who would otherwise not be willing to assume 
such a risk to take on the exchange rate risk of the external 
debt from the economic agents of a given country. On this 
market, well-capitalised issuers with high, often AAA 
ratings – international (supranational) financial institutions 
(World Bank, European Investment Bank, European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development), national development 
institutions, global banks – issue bonds denominated in the 
currency of small, open economies. The reputation and 
excellent credit rating of the issuers make these securities 
appealing to final investors who would not otherwise buy 
bonds registered by the issuers of the given country and 
denominated in their domestic currency. The funds raised 
by the high-graded issuer and denominated in the currency 
of the given country reach the financial intermediary system 
operating in that country – through the financial transactions 
detailed in the following sub-sections – and thus, ultimately 
the exchange rate risk arising when the small, open country 
borrows funds abroad is taken by a foreign agent, the 
bondholder. In effect, assuming that balance of payments 
deficit is a given, the significance of the Eurobond markets 
in terms of the macroeconomy lies in allowing the given 
country to finance its external deficit in its own currency 
instead of a foreign one. Ultimately, the Eurobond market 
serves as a potential way to escape “original sin”.
The deepening integration of the financial markets since the 
mid 1990s facilitated the issue of bonds denominated in the 
currencies of emerging countries by the abovementioned 
institutions. Nevertheless, in the case of most emerging 
countries the aggregate value of the portfolio of Eurobonds 
issued in their domestic currency is marginal compared to 
the net external debt of the country in question. However, 
in some countries – for example, New Zealand, Australia 
and South Africa – Eurobond-type issues have reached a 
level where the foreign agents can make a considerable 
contribution to financing the net external debt. Concurrently, 
domestic companies and households take out credit in their 
own currency, bearing interest lower than would have been 
without issuing Eurobonds.
In South Africa and New Zealand, the outstanding 
Eurobonds cover a sizeable part of the exchange rate risk of 
these countries’ net external debt (Chart 1). The appeal of 
the bonds was probably increased by the fact that the 
currency of both countries has been the targ et of carry 
trade in recent decades. Although these two countries have 
bond portfolios which are of a similar size (40-50 billion 
dollars) and we can thus assume that investors have easy 
access to both markets, there is a major difference in terms 
o f  t h e i r  s i z e  c o m p a r e d  t o  t h e  e x t e r n a l  d e b t  o f  t h e s e  
countries. It should be noted that during the period under 
2   Carry trade in the widest sense means that an investor takes out credit in a currency with relatively low interest rate, and uses the funds to purchase assets 
denominated in another currency having a higher yield. To realise an extra return, the investor always assumes the risk of exchange rate fluctuations. For more details 
on the topic, please refer to the article by Kisgergely (2010).MNB BULLETIN • OCTOBER 2010 31
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review the net financing need of the general government 
was lower in New Zealand, and thus investors seeking to 
take up positions in New Zealand dollar appreciated the 
instruments, which were no less liquid than sovereign bonds 
but carried no credit risk.
By comparison, in the case of two other countries (Turkey 
and Hungary) with currencies bearing similarly high 
interest, both the volumes of the issues and their ratios to 
the external debt are much lower than in New Zealand and 
South Africa.
THE ISSUE PROCEDURE IN THE CASE OF 
A SUPRANATIONAL ISSUER
In order for the Eurobonds to actually perform their role in 
the real economy as described above, that is, allowing the 
funds raised by international financial institution in the 
Chat 1














































































































































































































































































































Net external debt of Turkey
3 Net external debts do not include special purpose vehicles.MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
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given currency to reach the borrowers in the same economy, 
generally further financial instruments are needed. 
Sometimes the issuing international institution lends the 
b o r r o w e d  fu n d s  d i r e c t l y  t o  t h e  c r e d i t  i n s t i tu t i o n s  o f  t h e  
given country. This, however, seldom happens. In most 
cases the issuer ultimately intends to obtain euros or dollars, 
and uses derivative transactions to convert the borrowed 
funds.
The example below illustrates this case. We assume that an 
international financial institution issued forint-denominated 
Eurobonds (euroforint bond). However, it actually seeks to 
o b t a i n  f u n d s  d e n o m i n a t e d  i n  e u r o  a t  l o n g  m a t u r i t y  a n d  
floating interest rate. The interest rate and currency 
mismatch can be eliminated with interest rate swaps.
For this, the issuer needs to conclude two swap transactions 
– with identical maturity dates to that of the bond issued – 
with another financial institution, generally with the 
investment bank acting as the lead manager for the bond 
issue. In the course of the first swap, an interest rate swap 
(IRS) transaction, the issuer receives a fixed forint interest 
used to cover its interest payment obligation deriving from 
the bond issue on the one hand, and pays a floating forint 
interest (typically corresponding to the 3-month BUBOR), 
on the other. If the yield of the bond4 is lower than the fixed 
interest established in the interest rate swap transaction, the 
issuer may interpret the difference as a quasi commission-
type income received in consideration for its reputation and 
AAA rating.
The second swap transaction is a so-called cross currency 
basis swap, whereby the issuer, having incurred a floating 
forint interest payment obligation, swaps this interest with 
a floating euro interest rate against a fee (cross currency 
basis swap spread). Whether the fee is paid or received by 
the issuer depends on the positive or negative value of the 
cross currency basis swap spread for the currency pair in 
question. Thus, in net terms, the issuer received a fixed 
f o r i n t  i n t e r e s t  a n d  p a y s  a  f l o a t i n g  e u r o  i n t e r e s t .  
Concurrently, the counterparty of the forint interest rate 
swap transaction will receive a floating forint from the 
bond issuer and pays a fixed interest therefore. Similarly, 
the counterparty bank of the cross currency basis swap 
will pay a floating forint interest and receive a floating 
euro interest.
An interest rate swap is a contract between two parties to exchange 
their interest payment obligations in a specific currency. During the 
term of the swap one of the counterparties pays a floating interest rate 
(generally specified as a short-term inter-bank reference yield, e.g. the 
3-month LIBOR, and a pre-determined premium5) to the other, who in 
turn pays a fixed interest. The transaction does not involve the exchange 
of the notional principal underlying the swap, in practice only the 
difference in interest payments is credited. The party paying the fixed 
rate (payer) profits from an increase in the short-term reference rate, 
while the party receiving the fixed interest (receiver) profits from a 




In a cross currency basis swap, at the time of concluding the transaction 
the underlying forint and foreign currency amounts are exchanged at 
the prevailing spot exchange rate. One of the parties pays the short-
term inter-bank reference rate in currency “A”, while the other pays the 
inter-bank rate of the corresponding maturity in currency “B”. At the 
time of concluding the transaction, the parties specify a fixed 
(annualised) fee payable by one of the parties to the other on the due 
dates of interest payments. This fee is called the cross currency basis 
swap spread, the value of which is expressed in basis points and added 
to the interest paid in the floating currency (e.g. in the case of a EUR/
HUF transaction, HUF). The amount of the spread depends on the 
extent of the counterparty risk on the one hand, and on the relative 
demand for the currencies on the other. In the event that the forint is in 
relatively high demand among Hungarian banks, foreign banks expect 
a premium for satisfying this demand for forint through the cross 
currency basis swap. Conversely, if Hungarian banks show relatively 
higher demand for euro than forint from their foreign counterparties, 
Definition of interest rate swap and cross currency basis swap
4   High-grade issuer, benchmark-size issues, and Euroclear eligibility are the main factors that contribute to the relatively low yield of those bonds.
5 On the inter-bank market interest rate swaps are generally quoted LIBOR-flat, i.e., the premium beyond the LIBOR and the fixed interest rate are netted.MNB BULLETIN • OCTOBER 2010 33
If we assume that the issuer concludes both swap transactions 
with Hungarian banks, we find a potential method for the 
Hungarian banking system to borrow funds abroad. In this 
case, the Hungarian bank pays a fixed forint interest during 
the term of the interest rate swap, and exchanges the 
received floating forint interest with a floating euro interest 
income by way of the basis swap. Thus, if a Hungarian bank 
borrows a euro credit bearing a floating interest rate on the 
inter-bank market, it will finance it with the euro payment 
leg of the swap, and in net terms it will only be obliged to 
pay the fixed forint interest and the spreads on the 
EURIBOR and the BUBOR rates. Consequently, these 
swaps helped the domestic bank to ultimately undertake a 
long-term forint debt with fixed interest rate by borrowing 
a euro-denominated credit with floating interest, which is 
much easier to access and finance.
POTENTIALS AND LIMITATIONS OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL FORINT-DENOMINATED...
the cross currency basis swap spread will be negative. Forint cross 
currency basis swap spreads have been negative for years, which is fully 
consistent with the fact that Hungarian banks would prefer financing 
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As a result of the above transaction, the lending operations 
of the Hungarian bank, already in possession of fixed rate 
forint funding, can shift to the placement of forint credit. 
Households and companies prefer taking out fixed interest 
credit in their domestic currency, and this demand can be 
satisfied with the credit products of the domestic bank 
bearing a fixed interest. For this, the bank needs to have 
available funds denominated in its domestic currency, for 
which it pays a fixed interest to minimise the interest rate 
risk.
It is worth noting that the borrowed forint can be used for 
purposes other than financing forint credit placed with a 
fixed interest rate as well, e.g. for the purchase of other 
forint instruments, among others, government securities, 
without assuming an exchange rate risk.
Investors buying the bond obtain the currency required for 
the purchase on the spot foreign exchange market. Typically, 
these are investors seeking to buy assets yielding high 
interest, thus they pursue a carry trade strategy; at the same 
time, they are not allowed to carry high risk assets (e.g. 
securities of emerging market governments) due to their risk 
management rules or for other reasons in their portfolio.
Taking a specific example, the model illustrated by Chart 2 
will operate as follows: the supranational issuer can issue a 
3-year forint bond with a 6.5 percent yield. At this time, the 
fixed leg of the forint interest rate swap with corresponding 
maturity amounts to 7.25 percent, while the forint-euro 
cross currency basis swap spread is -100 basis points. The 
issuer will realise a 0.75 percent interest gain on an annual 
level on the difference between the 6.5 percent and the 7.25 
percent, as against the 100 basis point interest expense 
arising from the cross currency basis swap, which means 
that under these conditions the bond issue and the associated 
transactions result in an annual loss of 25 basis points. If the 
cross currency basis swap spread decreased to -50 basis 
points, the issuer could attain a 25 basis point profit on the 
transaction.
If the issue is carried out under the above conditions, it will 
yield the following results: 
•   Domestic households and companies can take out credit 
denominated in the domestic currency and bearing a fixed 
interest rate (or at least with long interest payment 
periods) at possibly more favourable prices than otherwise.
•   The domestic bank can place mortgage loans denominated 
in the domestic currency and with long interest payment 
periods, while the cost of funds will correspond to the 
sum of the fixed rate of the swap transaction and the basis 
swap spread. The bank could in fact finance the mortgage 
loan denominated in its domestic currency with a foreign 
currency, however, that would create an open exchange 
rate position for the bank. At the same time, in the course 
of the transaction discussed above, the exchange rate risk 
is assumed by the ultimate investors.
•   The international financial institution obtains funds in 
dollar or euro on which it pays a floating interest rate. In 
addition, as a commission-type income (that may be 
construed as a premium for reputation/good credit rating) 
it will also receive the difference between the yield of the 
bond and the yield of the swap of the currency with 
corresponding maturity.
•   The foreign ultimate investors will hold bonds ensuring a 
fixed yield, at a rate similar to that offered by the 
securities of emerging market governments, however – as 
they were issued by a bank rated AAA – they are 
practically risk-free. In addition, they take up a long 
exchange rate position in the given currency.
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EUROFORINT 
BOND MARKET COMPARED TO 
INTERNATIONAL TRENDS
In the second half of the 1990s Eurobond issues denominated 
i n  h i g h  y i e l d i n g  c u r r e n c i e s  e x p a n d e d  d y n a m i c a l l y  
worldwide. The largest volumes were issued in Turkish lira, 
South African rand and Australian and New Zealand dollar. 
In case of all four currencies, bond issuers are dominantly 
supranational banks. Currently, these institutions have and 
outstanding amount of bonds issued coming out at nearly 
700 billion dollars, 70 percent of which was issued in the 
low yielding currencies of advanced economies. The rest of 
the outstanding bonds is comprised of high yielding 
currencies of advanced and emerging countries. Of them, 
we will discuss New Zealand and South Africa in greater 
detail.
From among high interest Eurobonds, the market of 
securities issued in New Zealand dollar boasts the longest 
history, and even at present the market of the so-called 
eurokiwi bonds (see Footnote 1) serves as reference for this 
securities type. The first issues took place late 1980s, and 
during the decades since then there have been two larger 
waves of issues: in the second half of 1990s and then again, 
in the years after the turn of the century the annual volume 
of securities issued approached 10 billion New Zealand 
dollars. The bonds issued had an average of three- to four-
year maturity. The considerations behind the issues are 
clearly evidenced by the – not too close – correlation 
between the volumes issued and the 2 and 3-year interest MNB BULLETIN • OCTOBER 2010 35
rate swap spreads, that is, high volume issues took place at 
times when the potential issuers could anticipate a 
considerable income from the difference between the 
interest on the bond and the yield realised on the interest 
rate swap. As a rule, issuers used the obtained New Zealand 
dollar liquidity – through interest rate swaps – to finance 
New Zealand banks (Drage et al., 2005).
South Africa started the issue of eurorand bonds late 1995. 
Until 1997 the market showed relatively modest expansion, in 
1996 bonds worth 1 billion USA dollars were issued. The 
breakthrough came in 1997, when the value of eurorand 
bonds, including 10- and 30-year securities reached as high as 
15 billion dollars (IMF, 1997). The issuers used the rands 
received for purchasing South African instruments (government 
securities). In the past years, evolution of the eurorand market 
has continued, and the currently outstanding bond portfolio 
exceeds the value of eurokiwi bonds outstanding.
Compared to these countries, the market of euroforint 
bonds only saw a slight development over the past ten years. 
The portfolio of bonds issued in forint by foreign economic 
agents abroad amounted to just approximately 520 billion 
forints at the end of March 2010. Nearly 70 percent of this 
portfolio comprises plain vanilla bonds, the rest consists of 
ABSs, CDOs and securities tied to various indices. As for 
the issuers, basically three groups can be distinguished: 
international organisations, financial institutions operating 
a subsidiary in Hungary and banks pursuing business 
operations independently from Hungary.
Financial institutions operating a subsidiary in Hungary 
account for 10 percent of euroforint bond issues. In their 
case (e.g. Erste, Citigroup, KBC, Unicredit) the issues could 
have served to hedge their asset-side forint exposure (loan 
from the parent company).
The bonds issued have an average term of 3 years, while the 
average volume of the individual series is 7 billion forints, 
being somewhat higher in the case of supranational banks 
and lower for the other issuers. Forint bonds issues by 
supranational financial institutions account for nearly 55 
percent of the entire market. This ratio is essentially the same 
as in the case of the currencies of other emerging economies. 
We can reasonably assume that similarly to the case of the 
other examined countries, the appearance of issues by 
supranationals also stimulated the market in Hungary. 
The question arises why has the euroforint bond markets 
remained relatively immature compared to the eurokiwi and 
eurorand markets. One of the most notable reasons is that of 
the transactions described above, cross currency basis swap 
became available in Hungary only after foreign exchange 
liberalisation. At the same time, as demonstrated below, on the 
one hand, during the period elapsed since, the pricing of the 
interest rate swaps shown in the financing model has scarcely 
allowed potential issuers to realise a profit on the issue, while 
on the other hand, lead manager banks incurred a loss on the 
interest rate swaps already concluded due to the subsequent 
evolution of short-term forint and euro interest rates.
MOTIVES OF THE ISSUERS
Beyond inter-bank borrowing, the fund-raising operations of 
supranational banks are also complemented by the cross 
currency interest rate swaps described above. In the course of 
the latter, bond issue generally takes place without a pre-defined 
issue plan and without targeting a specific currency basket.
POTENTIALS AND LIMITATIONS OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL FORINT-DENOMINATED...
Developed market currencies Emerging market currencies
EUR 37.5% ZAR 2.97%
USD 33.6% TRY 1.18%
AUD 6.26% BRL 1.04%
GBP 6.1% RUB 0.54%
JPY 4.4% PLN 0.28%
CHF 1.7% MXN 0.23%
NZD 1.18% CZK 0.20%
CAD 0.95% HUF 0.09%
Other 1.58% Other 0.13%
Table 1
  Currency composition of bonds issued by supranational institutions6 
 (August  2010)
Source: Bloomberg.
6   EBRD, EIB, World Bank.MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
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Issues are primarily determined by demand, that is the 
requirements of the ultimate bondholders. It is only 
worthwhile for a bank to issue a bond denominated in a 
h i g h  i n t e r e s t  c u r r e n c y  i f  t h e  a s s o c i a t e d  t r a n s a c t i o n s  c a n  
drive the cost of financing below the level of the interest on 
alternative dollar or euro financing. In a cross currency 
interest rate swap transaction, the supranational issuer 
receives the fixed leg of the New Zealand interest rate swap 
and pays the 3-month USD LIBOR. The difference between 
the fixed leg of the interest rate swap and the yield of the 
bond, adjusted by the cross currency basis swap spread will 
reduce the cost of funds for the bank by a fixed amount, 
which in this case corresponds to the 3-month USD LIBOR.
If the balance of these cash flows exceeds the sum paid as 
interest on the issued bond, the margin will be positive. At 
the time of making the decision on the issue, the question 
arises whether the amount of the 3-month USD LIBOR and 
the bond yield will exceed the New Zealand interest rate 
swap yield and the interest of the credit – tied to LIBOR – 
placed. In case of issues of bonds with a 3-year maturity 
during the period preceding the bankruptcy of Lehman 
Brothers, interest rate swap transactions reduced the cost of 
funds by an average of 20 basis points annually in the case 
of New Zealand dollar (see Chart 3).
Though this level falls behind the 30-60 basis points typically 
attained in the second half of the 1990s – the period of rapid 
expansion in eurokiwi issues – the volume of issues has not 
decreased substantially. Since October 2008 the spread has 
been mainly negative, and this resulted in a fall in the volume 
of issues. In the case of forint issues, the spread was 
considerably higher in the past three years, at 35-40 basis 
points on average in 2007 –2008, then falling to around 0 
basis point from the second quarter of 2009. Nevertheless, 
forint-denominated bonds were issued less frequently and in 
lower amounts than eurokiwi bonds. Though the negative 
interest margin poses a tangible barrier to the issuers, during 
periods when issues failed to increase despite a positive 
margin, the reason behind the relative unpopularity of these 
transactions should be sought on the demand side.
MOTIVES OF HUNGARIAN BANKS
Currently, the conditions for raising fixed-interest forint 
funds abroad are still unfavourable in the Hungarian 
banking system, even if domestic companies and households 
would generate demand. To realise the forint borrowing 
transaction described in this article, Hungarian banks 
should have substantial excess foreign currency liquidity or 
should at least be able to raise such funds on the international 
inter-bank market. Currently, the majority of Hungarian 
banks is in the opposite position.
In the balance sheet of the Hungarian banking system, there 
is a discrepancy between the currency composition of assets 
Chart 3
Yields on 3-year bonds issued in New Zealand dollar (on the left) and forint (on the right), vs. interest rate 
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and liabilities; this situation has evolved during recent years 
because the expanding foreign currency lending is mainly 
offset by forint deposits on the liability side. Accordingly, 
d o m e s t i c  b a n k s  h a v e  a n  e x p o s u r e  a g a i n s t  f o r i n t  (long 
foreign currency, short forint position) in their balance 
sheet. Closing of the entire open position is ensured by FX 
swap transactions. However, from the bank’s perspective 
the forward leg of the foreign exchange swap transactions 
– appearing as an off-balance sheet item – represents foreign 
currency liability and a concurrent receivable in forint, thus 
it results in the closure of the total open foreign exchange 
position (balance sheet and off-balance sheet) (Table 4).
Thus, in previous years Hungarian banks have acted as 
borrowers of an increasing amount of foreign currency by 
using FX swap transactions (Chart 4). This strong demand 
for foreign currency and supply of forint has been clearly 
reflected in the evolution of a cross currency basis swap 
spreads since October 2008 as a result of the decline in 
inter-bank euro liquidity, and later the reduced risk 
propensity limits towards the Hungarian banking system. 
The negative cross currency basis swap spread means that a 
Hungarian bank with abundant forint liquidity will pay 
lower interest on the forint received in the course of a cross 
currency basis swap than the short-term inter-bank rate. In 
other words, a Hungarian bank experiencing tension in 
foreign currency liquidity would only be willing to lend 
euros to a foreign bank if it received the short-term 
EURIBOR interest and the forint funds borrowed in the 
transaction secured an extra income offsetting the effects of 
giving up its euro liquidity.
The Hungarian banking system would only be capable of 
integrating this transaction in the financing model specified 
in the section entitled “The issue procedure in the case of a 
supranational issuer” if its open foreign exchange positions 
recognised in its balance sheet decreased markedly by either 
downsizing the volume of foreign exchange loans or by 
increasing the foreign currency liabilities. Although this is 
not possible in the short run, in the longer term this barrier 
most likely be removed by the gradual decrease in the 
FX-loan portfolios.
MOTIVES OF INVESTORS
According to anecdotal information, Eurobonds are 
purchased by institutional investors with a conservative risk 
profile on the one hand, and small investors of developed 
countries, on the other. Typically they are willing to take no 
or only minimal credit risk, but at the same time, seeking to 
realise a higher interest they are not deterred by an exchange 
rate risk. They primarily seek foreign currencies supported 
by a credible and prudent economic policy which mitigates 
the risk of sudden exchange rate depreciation. Another 
advantage is a clearly defined factor which influences the 
exchange rate, e.g. commodity prices offers the potential for 
the appreciation of the given currency in the long run.
Below we provide a more detailed analysis of three currencies 
in which supranational banks issued eurokiwi-type bonds. 
Seeking the explanation for the varying interest of investors 
in these three currencies, we compare the bonds denominated 
in forint which is relevant to us, the quasi traditional New 
Zealand dollar-based bonds and the South African rand-
based bonds issued in a considerable volume.
We compare the performances and risk levels relating to 
bonds issued by supranational banks, with those of portfolios 
comprising the government bonds of these countries, as well 
as with those of the carry trade positions taken up in respect 
of the examined currencies. We simulate these three 
investment strategies in respect of the three currencies 
based on monthly data for the period between January 2007 
and August 2010 and converted to US dollar. We provide 
three explanations for the investor attitude towards 
eurokiwi-type bonds. Our first hypothesis is that bond 
buyers possibly find bonds issued in high yield currencies 
but also having a relatively stable exchange rate more 
appealing. Secondly, we assume that AAA-rated bonds 
denominated in the currency of countries with riskier 
government securities are higher in demand than those of 
countries where the government securities are nearer to the 
AAA rating. We derived this assumption from the fact that 
investors who may only carry low-risk (e.g. rated AA or 
higher) securities are able to undertake a risk in New 
Zealand dollar by buying government securities, but can 
only do so in forint by buying low-risk euroforint bonds. 
Thus, euroforint bonds could yield a higher margin for them 
Chart 4
Evolution of the foreign currency demand of 
Hungarian banks and cross currency basis swap 
spreads
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t h a n  e u r o k i w i  b o n d .  F u r t h e r m o r e ,  w e  a l s o  a s s u m e  t h a t  
regardless of the above mentioned two factors, among 
Eurobonds, securities with a higher Sharpe-ratio 7 will be 
preferred.
We map the motives and alternative investment options of 
the investors by examining the abovementioned three 
strategies. The results verified our first hypothesis only 
partially. Eurokiwi bonds boasted the highest Sharpe ratio 
(Table 2), which is consistent with the fact that they attract 
the most intense interest among investors, based on the 
frequency and amount of these issues. Based on the volumes 
i s s u e d  a n d  t h e i r  i n h e r e n t  r i s k  l e v e l ,  w e  e x p e c t e d  t h a t  
eurorand bonds would ensure a more favourable yield than 
euroforint bonds. However, this assumption was not 
underpinned by evidence, which may imply that the buoyant 
demand for eurorand bonds is significantly influenced by 
factors which cannot be identified with quantitative 
methods. In addition, it may be reasonable to deduce that 
the demand for eurorand bonds is driven by market actors 
which are able to hedge the tranche of the yield arising from 
exchange rate fluctuations. These investors are probably 
South African residents.
Our assumption that bond buying investors possibly prefer 
bonds issued in currencies yielding high interest, but also 
having a relatively stable exchange rate was not verified. 
The yield realised by those pursuing a carry trade strategy 
significantly exceeded that of Eurobond investments. This 
may imply that carry trade s t r a t e g i e s  a r e  p l a y e d  i n  t h e  
foreign exchange market rather than on the Eurobond 
market.
The findings seem to support our assumption that in the 
case of countries issuing government securities with weaker 
ratings, investors may find Eurobonds more appealing. 
During the period under review, New Zealand government 
bonds were rated ’AAA’, South African government securities 
’A+’ while Hungarian government securities were 
downgraded from ’BBB+’ to ’BBB–’. During this period, of 
the three government securities portfolios, a positive yield 
could be realised on the forint and New Zealand dollar 
portfolios, while those holding South African government 
securities incurred a loss. For those investors whose risk 
management principles did not set an effective restriction as 
to credit rating, buying government securities proved to be 
a more valuable investment than buying Eurobonds, in the 
case of all three currencies. This also means that those 
investors for which credit rating posed an effective limitation 
could only by AAA-rated Eurobonds, nevertheless, the 
performance of their portfolio did not significantly differ 
from that of the government securities portfolios.
CONCLUSIONS
Despite the small number of issuers, eurokiwi-type bonds 
have a relatively liquid market. Although hypothetically this 
market allows domestic sectors to hedge the exchange rate 
risk of external debt, there are only a few examples for its 
actual realisation among small, open economies. In the case 
of countries where issuers were able to achieve a positive 
interest margin on the transaction in recent years, the 
volume of the outstanding bond portfolio is relatively high. 
Although in the case of Hungary there is a significant 
surplus between the bonds to be issued and the interest rate 
swap yields with corresponding maturities, issuers would 
sustain a loss on bond issues due to the deeply negative value 
of the cross currency basis swap spread. As for cross 
currency basis swaps – reflecting the strong need of the 
banking system for liquid foreign currency – have been in 
the negative band for years in Hungary. Any positive 
development could only be observed in the event of a 
fundamental change of the key underlying factors; however, 
this is unlikely to happen over the short run as it would 
require a change in the sign of the open balance sheet 
positions of the banks, which can only take place 
7   The Sharpe ratio is a measure of the excess return per unit of volatility on an asset carrying a risk. In other words, from among investments having the same volatility 
(identical risk) the one yielding the highest return will have the highest Sharpe ratio. This investment will compensates the investors to the largest extent for the given 
risk taken. A negative Sharpe ratio indicates that the given investment secures a lower return than a risk-free yield.
Table 2
  Comparison of investment strategies in the case of the three examined currencies
AAA-rated eurobond investment Government bond investment Carry trade on the FX-market
Annualized return Sharpe ratio Annualized return Sharpe ratio Annualized return Sharpe ratio
NZD 2.34% 0.10 5.85% 0.29 8.36% 0.41
HUF 1.17% 0.05 2.69% 0.10 5.38% 0.30
ZAR –6.27% –0.27 –0.97% –0.05 9.65% 0.47
Source: Bloomberg, Datastream.MNB BULLETIN • OCTOBER 2010 39
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concurrently with phasing out their foreign exchange loan 
portfolio. There are several reasons for not applying this 
financing method in Hungary instead of intensifying 
foreign exchange lending operations in the previous years. 
On the one hand, borrowers having compared the levels of 
exchange rate risk and interest rates found foreign currency 
loans more attractive than forint loans which, though they 
carried no exchange rate risk, were characterised by 
somewhat higher interest rates. On the other hand, investors 
s h o w e d  a  m o d e s t  i n t e r e s t  i n  e u r o f o r i n t  b o n d s  o n  t h e  
international financial market, largely attributable to the 
sizeable supply of Hungarian government securities offered 
t o  m a r k e t  a g e n t s  i n t e n d i n g  t o  t a k e  u p  a  f o r i n t  p o s i t i o n .  
Thus, only a relatively narrow set of investors – forced by 
their risk management rules – could opt for euroforint 
bonds only. 
Over the long run, the Hungarian banking system will only 
be able to tap the euroforint market and draw on forint 
funds with longer re-pricing periods abroad if becoming 
indebted in forint becomes attractive for domestic borrowers, 
and concurrently foreign savers and investors consider 
macroeconomic prospects sufficiently reliable and appealing 
to assume the exchange rate risk.
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